“Palestinian Diplomacy at a Crossroads”

Transcript of Remarks by Ziad Abu Amr
For the Record No. 253 (1 May 2006)*

At a recent Palestine Center briefing, Palestinian legislator Ziad Abu Amr addressed the new diplomatic landscape facing Palestinians and cautioned against the bifurcation taking place in Palestinian political circles between the Islamic party Hamas and the secular party Fateh. His presentation was the first appearance by any elected PLC member in the United States since the January 2006 legislative elections. Abu Amr is author of Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad (1994). He spoke for 25 minutes and then took questions from the audience, an edited transcript of which is below. This “For the Record” can be accessed online at http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/images/fortherecord.php?ID=269.

The Palestine Center
Washington, DC
27 April 2006

Dr. Ziad Abu Amr:

Thank you Samar for inviting me and thank you all for being here. It’s my pleasure to be back in Washington and in the Center here and I know there’s a great deal of interest in knowing what is going on back home in Palestine. There is a lot so I’ll try to cover some of the pressing themes and perhaps in the discussion I can respond to whatever other questions you may have.

First of all, I think that you and many others were surprised at the outcome of the Palestinian legislative elections and the landslide victory of the Hamas movement. What to me personally was of equal surprise was the way the elections took place: peacefully, with integrity, democratically and in a very clean way, contrary to all expectations-including my own, as one involved in the mediations between the President and the Hamas leadership and between Fateh and Hamas, and in working with other Palestinian factions on the preparations for the elections and the means of ensuring their integrity.

Despite all of that work, I was still anxious. I could not believe that Election Day finished in that very impressive fashion. This is why the Palestinians are rather surprised at the reaction of certain countries, including the United States and some European countries, to the outcome of this election. They noted the irony that the United States wanted democracy and democratic elections but it didn’t want to accept the outcome. This is not the theme of my discussion but I thought that I would tell you that the Palestinians do not really appreciate this kind of pressure, boycott, and punishment for something so impressive they have done-the democratic transformation and democratic conduct.

As we speak here today, things in Palestine are deteriorating on the ground and especially in the Gaza Strip. The situation may be on the verge of collapse. People have not received their salaries for the second month running in an area where unemployment exceeds 40 percent and 64 percent of the people live under the poverty line. The Palestinian areas depend heavily on foreign assistance, which has been suspended since Hamas formed the Palestinian government. The Israeli government on its part is withholding transfers to the Palestinian Authority of the money that is collected from Palestinians as tax and customs money. This is Palestinian money and not Israeli money.

The continuation of this financial hardship may have extremely negative repercussions, as it can cause a collapse of the security, political and social order. This would make us ask the question whether the suspension of financial assistance to the Palestinians was the right thing to do or whether the United States and other parties should engage the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian government in a different way, using different methods in order to settle the existing political differences. Palestinian society and the Palestinian Authority are very fragile and cannot take this overwhelming international pressure.

The collapse of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian social order cannot serve the purpose of creating and maintaining law and order or security, peace and stability. People wonder about the wisdom of the United States pursuing this path if things would end in a collapse of the Palestinian order, which would not even serve the security interests of Israel itself.

On another front, Israeli insurgencies, seizures, restrictions of movement, assassinations, and arrests of Palestinians are continuing and are threatening the very fragile truce or period of calm that exists between the Palestinians and Israelis. The northern part of Gaza is bombarded on a daily basis and for long hours. The Palestinians fire their primitive home-made rockets. Recently there was a suicide attack inside Israel. The circle of violence may be renewed, and escalation is the most likely scenario.

The Israeli government is also continuing the construction of the separation Wall, which confiscates large portions of Palestinian land. Jewish settlement expansion is continuing and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is getting ready to implement a unilateral disengagement plan in the West Bank which, in his words, would draw the final borders of Israel with the Palestinians.

All of that is done unilaterally and in violation of concluded agreements with the Palestinians under the pretext that there is no Palestinian partner to negotiate with. Of course, we have heard this story many times in the past and I think it is false. It is my firm belief that this Israeli plan will bring neither peace nor security, and as long as there is no negotiated final status agreement with the Palestinian side, the conflict and violence will continue.

On the Palestinian internal front, tension is rising. The suspension of financial assistance and the American and European boycott of the Hamas government, as well as the continued Israeli aggressive measures, are exacerbating the internal Palestinian tension. After the landslide victory in the elections, Hamas is having difficulty adjusting to the existing political realities. The transition from an opposition and resistance movement is proving to be difficult.

Likewise, the Fateh movement is also having difficulty adjusting to its new status and role as an opposition party. What adds to the complexity of the relationship between Fateh and Hamas is that while Fateh is the opposition now, the leader of Fateh is the President of the Palestinian Authority. This creates a problem between the presidency and the government in terms of working together, despite the fact that the basic law defines the responsibility of both. The fact that we have a pure Hamas government and all the suspicions and competition from Fateh lead to the fear that Fateh is trying to undermine the Hamas government. So the relationship between the presidency and the government is not working at this point and there are problems.

Also, the Hamas government is unable to exercise political rule because after elections, PA ministries and institutions have new ministers from Hamas but the rest of the staff, the people and the bureaucracy are mainly from the Fateh movement. There is no willingness to cooperate, so you may have a Hamas minister, for example, but the rest are not from Hamas. This does not make it easy for a Hamas minister to administer or rule in a ministry of any sort.

The same applies to security. The security services belong to the President or are mainly comprised of Fateh people, while the Minister of the Interior in charge of maintaining security is a Hamas leader. You probably have heard of the friction and the tension and the differences now rising about responsibilities. Hamas basically cannot run the administration or the security situation, let alone implement its program of reform in these two areas-in the administration and the security arena-as well as the financial arena.

I think it is far-fetched to talk about financial reform when you don’t have money to pay salaries. The primary concern of Hamas at this point is to ensure that the money is there. However, that money is not coming and it doesn’t look like it will be coming soon. I think Hamas’ failure to establish a national unity government has contributed to this complexity of the situation. So far, for example, Hamas has not succeeded in implementing any part of its election platform-that is, its program of reform-and I think the Palestinian street is beginning to feel the brunt of the current difficult situation.

What options does Hamas have to deal with this situation? I think one option is to say, “We will remain steadfast. We’ll stay put and things will change.” I don’t think this option is attainable because there are no indications that waiting more or staying steadfast will change the attitudes of the very influential parties in the world, especially the United States and the European Union. This is really not a practical option.

The other option is for the Hamas government to say sorry, resign or quit, but I don’t think Hamas is going to do that because a voluntary resignation would be construed as an acknowledged failure of Hamas and the Islamic movement in Palestine and a failure in political rule. This move would not be supported by other Islamic movements in the region either, because they were hoping to see an Islamic model and political rule working somewhere that can be taken as a model and emulated. It would help Islamic movements in their respective countries, so Islamic movements would not be very enthusiastic to see Hamas leave. That’s why you hear cries from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and in Jordan and Islamists in the Arabian Gulf-everyone wants to support Hamas because they hope to see an Islamic model in political office working so it can be established as a model. I don’t think Hamas is going to willingly resign.

The third option is for Hamas to go back to the resistance. I think Hamas cannot afford this sort of option because one of the reasons why it wanted to go to elections was to gain political and legal legitimacy. This was repeatedly declared by the Hamas leadership, which said it was keen on participating and power sharing in the political partnership because it wanted political legitimacy. If they go back to their resistance, they will lose this political legitimacy and will also make themselves a legitimate target for Israel’s tough retribution. I don’t think the Israelis will tolerate these major shifts in policies on the part of the Hamas movement, especially when the whole world is mobilized against Hamas at this point.

So what are the options that are available to get out of this national crisis? It’s not only a Hamas crisis; it is a national crisis. I think the only available option, and I’m not sure whether it will work until after a long period of time or if it will help the Palestinians by creating new dynamics to salvage themselves out of this crisis, is to resume national dialogue and to agree on a certain national political program that would allow Hamas to enter the PLO.

If the Palestinians agree on a political program and if Hamas enters the PLO, at least the polarization within Palestinian society would end and the Palestinians would be united on one position. They would be in a better position to talk to the rest of the world, but now even the rest of the world says to the Palestinians, “Look, you are not in agreement. You are polarized. So why are you surprised that we are taking positions vis-à-vis Hamas?”

Perhaps now Hamas will find it a matter of necessity to resume the dialogue, to agree on a certain political program within the framework of the PLO, and to form a national coalition government with the Fateh movement and other Palestinian groups. In fact, this happened before I came here. I made it an initiative myself. I met with the [Palestinian] President and then I met with the Hamas Prime Minister and I proposed this business of resuming the national dialogue. I think there was a receptive attitude. Since then, these meetings have been taking place. Today in the press there will be a national dialogue conference announced where all factions can meet. I think this would help mitigate the current tensions and perhaps avert any imminent collapse of the internal order as a result of an eruption of internal violence. As I said earlier, this may create new dynamics for the internal Palestinian relationship and the Palestinian relationship with the rest of the world.

What about the United States? I think the United States should act as an honest broker and I don’t think they should continue playing. I know this may be rhetorical and unrealistic, but I don’t think the United States conducted itself in the past as an honest broker or that its primary sponsorship of the peace process has brought us any closer to peace. In fact, that type of biased attitude contributed to the failure of the peace process and it will continue to contribute to the failure of any negotiated settlement.

What we have to do is to repeat this perhaps unrealistic demand because American policy is not going to change after making this demand here. It would be helpful for the administration and the President to reiterate as often as he could his commitment to his vision and the two-state solution. I think the United States should also resist the Israeli plans to carry out a unilateral disengagement plan in the West Bank because this will not end the occupation which started in 1967 as was included in the President’s speech, where he said he was committed to something like that.

In fact, if Israel’s unilateral disengagement plan takes place, this will prejudice the permanent status negotiations because Jerusalem will be finished, the borders will be set, and the settlements will be also finalized in their current situation. There won’t be any negotiations on these issues, so what would we negotiate in the permanent status negotiations?

Of course, that kind of viable independent Palestinian state would practically be not possible. I think the administration should benefit from the experience of the unilateral disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip. Today I was trying to count the good things that resulted from that disengagement and I found that except for easier mobility across the Rafah border, everything else got worse in Gaza.

If that is going to be repeated in the West Bank after another unilateral disengagement plan, then nobody can suggest, nor can the U.S. administration defend, such a move as a step forward towards achieving an independent Palestinian state and a permanent peace between the Palestinians and Israelis.

I thank you very much for your patience.

Hoda Tawfik, al-Ahram - Neither Israel nor the United States will accept this option and I think you referred to this, so what is the other option? How do you get out of this dilemma? Hamas will never accept to be included in the PLO.

Ziad Abu Amr: I think if Hamas subscribes to the PLO program and says they are willing to be part of the PLO, maybe. We all know that the PLO recognized Israel, renounced violence and upholds concluded agreements. Unless the Americans and the Europeans or the Israelis are going to find a pretext-I mean, if they are interested in the substance, then the substance can be provided within the context of Hamas joining the PLO. In any case, we need to do that for our own sake to avert any internal violent conflict.

George Hishmeh, Freelance Journalist - I have two questions. First, what is Fateh doing to change the image it has gained in the last few months? Secondly, what is Hamas doing to learn more diplomatic speak-what are some things it should say and some it should not, for example in condoning the Tel Aviv suicide bombing?

Abu Amr: This is not “nice” talk for Hamas or “bad” talk. This is a political position. If we talk about change, we’re not talking about the style and rhetoric. We’re talking about the major political commitments. Hamas so far has done very little to change except upholding firmly to that truce, which Hamas thinks-and maybe it is right-that would be a good trade off as far as Israelis are concerned. As long as there is no Hamas violence on the ground the Israelis will still perhaps wait for Hamas to make political changes. What Israel cares more about is what happens in the security sphere on the ground and not public statements, because they say, “President Abbas makes all the good statements but we don’t see delivery on the ground.”

I’m not sure that Hamas’ delivery is adequate from the Israeli point of view because firing Qassam rockets and other acts of violence are continuing and Hamas is not condemning them. They are condoning them and they are not going to prevent them, so I don’t know how long this relationship will continue. It’s not a question of diplomacy-even on that level Hamas is not changing very much, unfortunately, despite the advice they get. I tell you, I think these people don’t have enough experience in international politics. This is one important thing. Perhaps over time they will learn how to be more appealing to the rest of the world; I’m not sure though.

As far as Fateh is concerned, Fateh is not keen on seeing Hamas succeed. It is true that we have a uniquely democratic experience, but I don’t think we have a deeply-rooted democratic culture and tradition to say, “Okay, with all your good heart, this is yours. You deserve it. I will wait for my turn.” I don’t think this is the case-it’s not like that. It’s not easy to be removed from power after monopolizing power after tens of years and enjoying the advantages and privileges, political and otherwise. Now Fateh is in the backseat.

However, some people also are evolving in the right direction and saying that maybe we need to accept the new political realities and that we have to wait for the elections. Things are not settled one way or another. Fateh is still divided. However, I would say that after it was removed from power, it has less to fight over. I think that the fact it was defeated in the last elections may be a catalyst for internal change and unity, perhaps.

Karim Nashashibi, International Monetary Fund: For two years, President Abbas was talking about having one security service, disarming militia and getting a grip on security, but he has completely failed. Islamic Jihad continues to do what it wants; the rockets are going to Israel-do you think that Hamas can have a grip on security and how will it do that?

Abu Amr: I think that first of all, as you recall, President Abbas tried all the technical measures on the ground to fix the situation with his security services. He tried to talk the other factions into it and we managed to get a truce but not much more than that. One of the reasons that Mr. Abbas was keen on the elections was to create one single Authority and to unite the security services. That was the thing. Many Fateh people and others were surprised why Abbas was so persistent in insisting that the elections be held on time. I know how much pressure he was exposed to inside Fateh, yet he said there is no way, it has to be done. In his mind, this was the only way to solve the question of one security, one Authority.

Now, can Hamas do it? I don’t think so unless Fateh becomes a partner. Not necessarily a partner in the government, but unless Fateh agrees to a joining program of some sort, it will not work. So, an understanding with Fateh is essential for the success of Hamas in all areas-the administration, the finance, the security.

I cannot see how Fateh at this point will lend its help and support to Hamas before other things are sorted out. Hamas alone cannot do it. Remember there are some other factions-Islamic Jihad for example. If Hamas and Fateh agree, it would be easier to talk Islamic Jihad into that kind of agreement the way we succeeded in including them in the truce when they had no stake in it in the first place. They were not interested in the elections, the PLO or any joint program, but when everybody agreed to the truce, they didn’t want to look odd or be outside the truce even if they managed now and again to violate it.

Ian Tobman, Canadian Embassy - There has been a lot of talk that the Americans might put money into the Presidential guard empowering Abbas. Do you see this as a good idea or that it adds another level of security services which you just said goes against Abbas’ first objective?

Abu Amr: Well, we have heard stuff like that but no actual support has come yet to the Presidential guard yet. I don’t think this piece-meal, selective approach will work. I think the U.S. needs to review its entire approach vis-à-vis the Palestinians. After all, it was the one who pushed for elections-why punish the Palestinians for something you almost made conditional for continued American support?

I think there is a different, more constructive way of engaging the Palestinians and the Palestinian Authority without creating parallel structures or authorities such as in supporting a Presidential guard. This is not a sound policy. I think we need to see something more serious and more encompassing. The Palestinians need to be involved in this. That applies to all international efforts of channeling money to the Palestinians without the acquiescence and approval of the Palestinian Authority and government. Nothing of that will work and the Americans know that.

Peter Bechtold - Dr. Ziad, I want to thank you not only for coming but for helping us for so many years to understand the situation through your published research and many interviews on Western television channels. You’ve done a lot and people over here need to hear an educated Palestinian voice, so thank you. My question is how large is the block of independents-are they only intellectuals? Do they have support? Is it possible to become a third force?

Abu Amr: Unfortunately, out of the 132-member Palestinian Legislative Council, we normally have four independents but I think you can only talk about two because the other two have clear political and ideological leanings. We have about twelve other people who have formed blocs, like [PLC member] Hanan Ashrawi and [former PA Finance Minister] Salaam Fayyad. There are a few more from the other PLO factions, but the Council is polarized.

You have 74 seats for Hamas and 47 for Fateh. These are the two major blocs. The margin for the independents and all the other blocs is very narrow. I am one of ten who were there in the previous PLC and we have tried to have an impact by virtue of having experience, hopefully the maturity, and soundness of reasoning. But it is too early to talk about having a real third party to stand between Fateh and Hamas at this point. This will take some time perhaps.

Jerome Segal, University of Maryland - I wonder if I could get you to be more concrete or specific about what would happen if there were renewed negotiations about a unity government. Can you tick off what you think would be the three or four principal demands you think Fateh would make and to what extent you think Hamas would be forthcoming with respect to those?

Abu Amr: I think Hamas feels more pressed now for a way out. I think enough time has lapsed now. Hamas hoped it would bring the world to accept its platform and its positions but now it is finding out this is not the case. It is also finding out that Palestinian society is not interested in this kind of stalemate. Somebody has to take an initiative and they are looking at the incumbent party the way we used to look at Fateh for not initiating things.

I think what Hamas would do is to find some sort of articulation or maybe just say outright that they will join the PLO, but this is not going to be easy. I am telling you, it is not going to be easy. Hamas and the Islamic movement the Muslim Brotherhood-the mother organization of Hamas-don’t look at the PLO as something holy. In fact, they look at the PLO with scorn. They think it is belittling for Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood to enter this narrow, secular, decadent, dysfunctional framework unless the PLO is Islamized like the [Palestinian Legislative] Council. The previous Council was bad but now this Council is good, because Hamas has a majority in it. So if Hamas is there in the PLO and Hamas controls the decision-making process in the PLO, then the PLO would have a different content, a different role, a different function.

I don’t see this materializing anytime soon but there will be attempts to work out some kind of temporary arrangement to get out of this current crisis. No more, no less-just to buy some time. That is no guarantee that this will put an end to the risks of internal fights or that the world will change its position, but it will buy some time. That is all I can count on at this time.

Mohamed Nimer, Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR): If Hamas agrees to enter the PLO without radically reforming the PLO and not inhibiting Hamas’ choices in terms of resistance, then what would be the incentive for Israel to negotiate any further if Hamas enters the PLO with the current conditions, which means acquiescing to renouncing the use of arms against the Israeli occupation?

Abu Amr: I don’t think that Hamas is required as a movement to say, “We recognize Israel.” There is a system and there is an order-Hamas is joining this order as a party but it is not required that every single party that joins the political system make foreign policy of its own or to make agreements. They could see that we respect the commitments of the PLO or the Authority and leave it as general as that. Then you leave it to President Mahmoud Abbas, the President, and the Palestinian Authority to deal with another country as sovereign entities.

Hamas now says that it won’t enter the PLO until it is reformed. Hamas could say that it will enter the PLO and that it will reform it and commit to a program of reform. But it is a no-starter to say that until the PLO is reformed according to our vision or a joint national consensus vision that we will not join the PLO. Hamas can make it easier for itself and other Palestinians to say, “We are entering the PLO and we hereby agree on a certain political program to reform it.”

Now, as far as the resistance, Hamas as a movement can stick to all of its positions. They can say, for example, that we will maintain the resistance as an option but we will uphold the truce and not attack civilian targets inside Israel. There is a way, if you want to find it. If you want to find a way, you can. But you see, Hamas is not yet ready for this kind of thinking and political performance and articulations. I think the moment may have to come, because there is no other way.

Cem Sey, Deutsche Welle Radio - You said that the world has isolated Hamas but I would disagree. NATO-member Turkey tried to stay in touch with Hamas and Turkish diplomats say they are trying to influence Hamas in government and to change its mind about terrorism and terrorist means, but they don’t seem to be having success. Do you think such attempts of Turkish diplomats can change anything or, to the contrary, is this giving Hamas the feeling that they are not really isolated?

Abu Amr: Well, some would say that the Russian invitation to the Hamas leadership and the Turkish visit were counterproductive in that sense, that they did not help Hamas to see the reality outright and that they may have given it the wrong impression that it can maneuver its way around without making the required changes to their positions.

With all due respect, to tell you the truth, I think Turkey can play a role but there hasn’t been continued engagement between the Turkish leadership and the Hamas leadership. [Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip] Erdogan called [Hamas leader Ismail] Haniyeh when he was appointed Prime Minister and they received the Hamas delegation, but you know the real engagement is to be there and try to work out certain formulas and arrangements. Turkey hasn’t been doing this.

Turkey is not the only so-called Islamic influence on Hamas. You have Saudi Arabia, you have Iran, you have the Arabian Gulf states, you have Egypt-but what counts in the final analysis is the United States of America because they call the shots, even for the European Union. I say that with all due respect to everyone.

Ahmed Ayish - Dr. Ziad, you were elected with the support of Hamas and I understand that you were invited to join the government and you didn’t. What makes you think that Fateh will cooperate since moderate people like you didn’t cooperate? Would you consider joining the Hamas government?

Abu Amr: Well, I said that if we have a national coalition government, I would consider any offer. This is what I said. That means we would agree on a national political program that would be acceptable to all the Palestinians, the Palestinian president, and perhaps to the rest of the world-or at least many influential parts. I thought this would be the way to success for the government, for Palestinians, and for me if I acted as a foreign minister. I mean, what is the point of being a foreign minister in a Hamas government if I can’t come and see you here? So that was my advice of what was necessary.

Even if Fateh did not join the government, and Fateh is free-you can’t force them-but Fateh will have a different position at least publicly when Hamas is committed to a national unity government and a national political program. This is important for Hamas before it becomes important for others, because you can unite the Palestinians behind a national unity government which may be lead by Hamas.

To tell you the truth, my advice to Hamas was to stay away from the government altogether and to have a government of technocrats and independents. Why put yourself through all this trouble? If you just control the Parliament, Hamas would have been in a better position to implement its program of change and reform if they stayed only in the parliament and stayed away from the government. But unfortunately, their overwhelming victory gave them the wrong impression. I hope there is space and time to reconsider that approach.

Clay Swisher, Middle East Institute - I’m so happy to hear you speak and I just want to acknowledge the role you played in this past year in moving between the factions, the Islamists and Fateh-particularly during the Gaza disengagement last year. There is no doubt that your efforts saved a lot of lives. I think you should be recognized for that.

I was wondering if you could talk about the situation in Gaza, especially at the border crossings. The Palestinians I talked to called [Karni Crossing] the Welch crossing-it was open when David Welch comes to the region, just for a photo op, but when he leaves [the Israelis] close it again. In the New York Times, there are photos of fruit rotting in the tonnage. How bad is the situation and what is your message for Washington?

Abu Amr: Yes, well, Rafah is fine after the coming of the European monitors. This was the best thing that happened to us after the Disengagement, but nothing else. Everything else has gotten worse. We don’t have a way to market our goods, so people throw the produce in the sea. In Karni, of course the Israelis say there are security threats and they close the crossing. It is very tough-yesterday there was a closing so I think it will be closed for more than a week now. The Israelis will make sure there is just enough to drip into the mouths of Palestinians so there won’t be starvation, but the situation is bad at all levels. Nobody can tell what it is going to be like in the future. Anything can erupt. The situation is extremely precarious.

Howard Moorland - Last month I spent a week in Bethlehem for a week with a group from here in Washington. When I look at a map and remember what I saw, I see one country there-I don’t see two countries. I try to envision what kind of sovereignty Palestinians could have in a country the size of Delaware embedded inside a country the size of New Jersey. There is only one government that makes laws there, one set of borders, one army, and one government that has control of all the power. The Palestinians are disenfranchised citizens of Israel as far as I can tell. Is anybody approaching the problem from that angle?

Abu Amr: There are circles even now in Palestine who talk about the idea that the two-state solution is no longer viable. Of course many Israelis are saying this and foreigners, but now even Palestinians are saying it. The late Edward Said had the foresight to say this a long time ago. At another level, not within this theoretical framework of the one-state solution, there are increasing Palestinian voices who say, “Why stick to a Palestinian Authority that is only a thin façade for occupation? Virtually, we are under occupation. Why mask the occupation and give it legitimacy by a Palestinian Parliament, a Palestinian President, or a Palestinian government? This doesn’t make sense.”

This kind of argument is increasing-that we should not help the occupation. It came in the past from a number of Palestinian intellectuals and academics, but now even political movements are talking about this. I’m worried that if things are brought to that kind of real-occupation situation, people will no longer want to see a façade PA that works in the service of the occupation. I think this is being speculated right now.

Nadim Makdisi - The PLO has always been a secular party. Hamas is an Islamic party. What is the position of the Christian Palestinians? Are they considered full citizens?

Abu Amr: Of course they are full citizens. Hamas supported some Christian candidates. In my district, there was at least one Christian. Hamas so far has not come close to any legislation to change the character of the Palestinian society. We don’t see any initiation of legislation that would be construed to Islamize the Palestinian society or political system.

Halim Barakat - It seems to me that the negotiations failed because the PLO accepted to start with the Oslo Agreement, although there is no definition or agreement as to what the net result is at the end. They agreed to postpone all the basic issues until later. I don’t think Israel had the same vision of compromising as what the Palestinians did. Perhaps Hamas won because the Palestinians finally realized that after twelve or thirteen years, the peace process is leading nowhere.

To be candid with you, I don’t think the resistance or the failure of the peace process were primary factors for the landslide victory of Hamas. It was the poor performance and the perceived and actual corruption of Fateh and the PA which led the people to seek real change. People were not thinking of resistance, because Fateh was involved in resistance. Those same people who voted for Hamas still support a peaceful settlement with Israel-even more so. They may be considerations, but it was not the key factor in the negotiations.

What you say may be the case about Oslo-it was how many years ago, twelve or thirteen? The Road Map defines the outcome of the negotiations. It talks about a two-state solution. But are things changing on the ground? They remain the same.

Question [Unidentified Audience Member] - Even though Hamas has a large majority in Parliament, the election percentages were a lot closer. I wonder if you could say something about the conclusions the Palestinian voters might be drawing about the failure of Hamas to engage with the political reality and what a second government would look like if Hamas were to fall out of power. The second question I have is to what extent the Islamic movements from outside Palestine playing a role. Is there any kind of interaction among them, discussion, interchanges?

Abu Amr: I think the external pressure of financial punishment and ending the financial assistance to the Palestinians is creating reaction. I think if Hamas fails, people will attribute this to the unfair politics of America and the European Union. Hamas will no doubt use that argument. It faces other internal difficulties with respect to internal rule; however, I think people are debating all these issues. Maybe the supporters of Hamas would accept in a blind fashion what Hamas says about who is obstructing its effort and its scheme. I think that when you don’t get your salary for two months in a row, in a poor country where few have independent resources, you rely on foreign assistance. So, people are questioning things and the debate is ongoing, real. I think that people are still assessing the situation, despite their sympathy with Hamas vis-à-vis the external pressure and the Palestinian people with their free and democratic choice. No, people are assessing the situation in realistic terms-do we need to be in this kind of dilemma? Could we have avoided it in some way?

I am sure the leadership of other Islamic movements are interacting with the Hamas leadership, since it is the international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood. When the Hamas leadership says that organizing Israel is not a Palestinian or Hamas affair or that [the land of Palestine] is not our own property, we cannot decide alone on this. This is an Islamic affair. So you can assume there is contact. I know for sure. When I was in Cairo on the last round of dialogues, and the Hamas leadership was there. When they finished the meetings, they went and met with the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in Egypt. That was announced in the media so they cannot deny it. They seek its advice.

But when it comes to material support, I don’t know how much the Islamists in Egypt can support the Palestinians in Gaza. The GNP per capita in Gaza is probably two times higher than the GNP per capita in Egypt. So you can’t expect these people who are poor to support an unpopular cause. How much money can the Muslim Brotherhood to support an entire country? It is not realistic here. Of course, Islamists in other countries can. I don’t know about Iran and I don’t know about Saudi Arabia, but these donations will never be enough to support the entire country. Charity will not solve the problem.

Raed Tayeh - As an expert, Ziad, I’m interested in your insights as to whether Hamas is internally and externally on the same page. Is Ismail Haniyeh taking his orders from Khaled Mishrad or are there some frictions now that Hamas is running the government? The second question is about the Qur’an and the Hadith. Are they moving away from their ideology as a divine belief or do you see them sticking to it?

Abu Amr: If they move away, they wouldn’t tell you. But, they are fortunate-as are all Islamists-that they have a doctrine that is extremely flexible and that lends itself to contradictory interpretations. If Hamas needs to find doctrinal cover for a truce, they can find it. Even for peace with Israel, they can find it if they want.

The doctrine is very hospitable here. Different Islamic movements, like the Islamists who are in the Israeli Knesset now, were just like Hamas is. They wanted to destroy Israel, they didn’t believe in a two-state situation, and now they are members in the Knesset, mayors of municipalities in Israel. They recognize the state of Israel. The doctrine is no obstacle, I think. If the interpreters and the religious authorities decide to use it in a different way they find fit, they will do it without problem.

Now, as far as the internal/eternal relationship is concerned, I think you had better look at Hamas as any real political party. There are competing views. There are personal rivalries, just like anybody else. Look at the Sudan and what happened between [the Sudanese religious leader Hassan] al-Turabi and [Sudanese President Omar] al-Bashir. In Jordan and Egypt there have been splits as well.

So far the movement has not been put into any serious position that merits splits or taking a final position. However, we need to remember that the leadership in exile works under a different set of imperatives, those of exile and its geography, while the leadership in the inside works under the imperatives of Palestinian society, the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli occupation. Because these people are apart, they cannot easy synchronize their positions or put them into harmony. For example, when they met in Cairo for the first time, some of them saw one another for the first time in their lives.

I think they need more personal interaction to come up with some shared values and shared positions, but the competitions and rivalries will continue no matter what.

Thank you.

Ziad Abu Amr was re-elected to the Palestinian legislature in 2006 as an independent from the Gaza City district. During his tenure in the first Palestinian Legislative Council (1996-2006), he served as head of the PLC Political Committee. The speaker’s views do not necessarily reflect those of the Jerusalem Fund for Education and Community Development or its educational program, The Palestine Center. This transcript may be used without permission but with proper attribution to The Palestine Center. It will be reissued in the 2006 annual compendium of Palestine Center publications. A listing of all Palestine Center event summaries and speaker transcripts to date can be accessed online at http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/palestinecenter/fortherecord.php.

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